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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the study was to investigate experimentally the impact of current mood state on 
anosognosia or awareness of symptoms in AD patients, in which mood state was manipulated by 
giving tasks that were either easy (success condition) or very difficult (failure condition). 
Twenty-two patients with mild to moderate AD participated. Four success-failure manipulation 
(SFM) computerized tasks were used as mood induction procedures, two based on reaction time 
tasks and the other on memory tasks. Level of awareness and the current mood state were 
assessed before and after each task, using a modified version of the Anosognosia Questionnaire 
for Dementia and a self-reported questionnaire respectively. For both types of task, the results 
indicate that the emotional state of the participants was similar before performing the tasks and 
that only the failure conditions induced a negative mood state. Additionally, regarding the level 
of awareness, there were no significant differences after the reaction time tasks but for the 
memory tasks, there was greater awareness of symptoms after performing the task in the failure 
condition. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first exploring experimentally the 
impact of mood on anosognosia in AD. The results showed an improvement of awareness of 
symptoms after negative mood induction, but only when the task used in the SFM was memory-
based.  
 
Key words: dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, awareness, anosognosia, mood 
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1. Introduction 
Anosognosia refers to a lack of awareness about deficit or condition as found in various 
neurological conditions, such as aphasia, hemiplegia and also dementia (Mograbi, Brown, & 
Morris, 2009; Ries et al., 2007; Stuss, Rosenbaum, Malcolm, Christiana, & Keenan, 2005; Stuss, 
1991). Unawareness regarding the disease or cognitive impairments is a common characteristic 
of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (Agnew & Morris, 1998; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004), with 
estimates obtained with large samples reaching almost 80% (Antoine, Antoine, Guermonprez, & 
Frigard, 2004; Mograbi, Ferri, et al., 2012; Sousa et al., 2015). Lack of awareness has several 
important clinical implications (Bertrand, Landeira-Fernandez, & Mograbi, 2013; Spalletta, 
Girardi, Caltagirone, & Orfei, 2012), which go from diminished treatment adherence (Arlt, 
Lindner, Rösler, & Von Renteln-Kruse, 2008), increased engagement in high-risk situations 
(Seltzer, Vasterling, Yoder, & Thompson, 1997; Starkstein, Jorge, Mizrahi, Adrian, & Robinson, 
2007), earlier institutionalization (Horning, Melrose, & Sultzer, 2014; Steele, Rovner, Chase, & 
Folstein, 1990) to increased caregiver burden (Clare et al., 2011; DeBettignies, Mahurin, & 
Pirozzolo, 1990; Rymer et al., 2002; Seltzer et al., 1997; Turró-Garriga et al., 2013).  
The relationship with mood is an important aspect of anosognosia and has been explored using 
three main approaches (Mograbi and Morris, 2014). First, studies show mixed results when 
exploring awareness for different objects in dementia, with some findings suggesting that 
patients with AD present greater unawareness for cognitive deficits relative to behavioural 
changes (Kotler-Cope & Camp, 1995) and others results indicating also an “affective 
anosognosia” (Verhülsdonk, Quack, Höft, Lange-Asschenfeldt, & Supprian, 2013), that is, a lack 
of awareness for mood disturbance. Second, the literature suggests that people with AD may 
present an emotional response to failure situations even in the absence of explicit awareness. For 
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example, Mograbi, Brown, Salas and Morris (2012) showed that, in a failure situation, patients 
with AD exhibited the same emotional reactivity as did controls, despite unawareness of their 
performance. Third, when exploring the relation between level of awareness of deficits and the 
presence of depressive symptoms, numerous studies indicate that patients with AD who have a 
higher level of depression show more awareness or less anosognosia (Clare et al., 2012; 
Harwood, Sultzer, & Wheatley, 2000). Two possible explanations for these results can be found 
in the literature. On one hand, depressed patients may show “depressive realism” or present 
apparently more awareness because of a negative bias when reporting problems. On the other 
hand, increased awareness of difficulties might lead to higher depression, through a reactive 
depression process. Investigating the role played by emotional factors in anosognosia for 
hemiplegia, Besharati, Kopelman, Avesani, Moro and Fotopoulou (2015) showed that 
experimentally induced negative feelings improved awareness for motor deficits in anosognosic 
patients with right-hemisphere lesions. However, the question of a causal link between 
awareness and mood and the direction of this relationship still remains.  
Another way to explore this link is through the well-known relationship between mood 
and memory. The most robust effects of mood on memory in the literature are the phenomena of 
mood-dependent memory (MDM) and mood-congruent memory (MCM). The former, as part of 
the global phenomenon of state-dependent memory, is improved memory for material when the 
subject’s mood is the same at the time of encoding and retrieval, this occurring independent of 
the material content (Bower, 1981; Eich & Metcalfe, 1989; Nutt & Lam, 2011). The latter refers 
to facilitated recovery of material when the emotional valence of this material is congruent with 
current mood (Bower, 1981). For example, when a person is currently in a positive mood state, 
the retrieval of positively toned material will be easier in comparison to the retrieval of negative 
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items. Most of the studies exploring MCM were conducted with young adults, but there are 
differential older adult effects. Specifically, Knight and Durbin (2015) reviewed studies with 
older adults and found a greater bias for recalling negative information when in a sad mood, 
compared to younger adults. Additionally, in a study including also AD participants, Fleming, 
Kim, Doo, Maguire, & Potkin (2003) demonstrated that AD patients remembered more negative 
items in an immediate recall memory task than neutral and positive words; healthy younger and 
older adults did not show this bias toward negatively toned material. The authors suggested the 
MCM effect as an explanation for these results. However, as current mood was not assessed, the 
data may not fully support their conclusions. Additionally, to the best of your knowledge, there is 
no published study exploring specifically the MDM and/or MCM effects in AD patients.  
The aim of the current study was to investigate the impact of the current mood state on 
awareness of symptoms in AD patients, more specifically on the recollection of memories linked 
to their condition. For this purpose, we induced specific mood states using two experimental 
success-failure manipulation paradigms, one involving a reaction time task and the other a 
memory task. Participants were asked to answer questions regarding their condition before and 
after each mood manipulation. By using this method, we intended  to explore not only the impact 
of mood on awareness but the additional influence of the context (memory vs. reaction time) on 
awareness as well. We hypothesized that the induction of a negative mood state would increase 
the retrieval of details regarding the patient’s own deficits. However, we anticipated that the type 
of task would affect differentially the level of anosognosia, with a more marked increase of 
awareness after memory tasks in comparison to reaction time tasks.  
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2. Methodology 
2.1. Participants 
Twenty-four participants with mild to moderate AD (17 females) were recruited from the Center 
for Alzheimer’s disease and Related Disorders (CDA) of the Institute of Psychiatry of the 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IPUB-UFRJ), Brazil. The clinical diagnosis of AD was 
made by a psychiatrist using clinical interviews with the patients and caregivers, cognitive 
screening tests, laboratory tests, and imaging. The participants were diagnosed with possible or 
probable AD according to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition 
(DSM-IV-TR,  American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and National Institute of Neurological 
and Communicative Diseases and Stroke/Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders 
Association (NINCDS-ADRDA; McKhann et al., 2011) criteria. The diagnostic work-up 
included complete   blood   cell   count, platelet count, glycemia, triglycerides, total cholesterol 
and fractions, alkaline phosphatase, glutamic oxaloacetic transaminase and glutamic pyruvic 
transaminase, bilirubins, urea, creatinine, total proteins, calcium, free T4 levels, TSH, VDRL, 
dosage of B12 and folates. Cranial CT scan or MRI scan with or without spectroscopy were also 
applied. People with scores of 18 or above in the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; 
Bertolucci, Brucki, Campacci, & Juliano, 1994) were included in the study. Exclusion criteria 
were history of other neurological disorder (also excluding cases with mixed AD and vascular 
dementia); history of head injury resulting in loss of consciousness for more than an hour; 
history of alcohol or substance abuse (based on ICD-10 criteria); and history of diagnosed major 
psychiatric illness or current psychological comorbidity (for example, mood disorder). Although 
no patient had a diagnosis of mood disorder, upon screening two patients showed depression 
symptoms, with scores on the GDS-15 above the cut-off of 5 (Marc, Raue, & Bruce, 2008). 
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These two participants were excluded from the following analyses, which were conducted with 
22 participants. 
 
2.2. Procedures 
In order to induce a specific mood state, two success-failure manipulation (SFM) computerized 
paradigms, developed by Mograbi et al. (2012), were used, one based on reaction time tasks 
(Experiment 1) and the other on memory tasks (Experiment 2) (for a full description of the 
development of the tasks, see Mograbi, Brown, Brand, & Morris, 2014). Two parallel versions 
were developed for each type of task (see description below). The SFM paradigms are designed 
to set and maintain the difficulty level of the task at a constant level, by first establishing the 
ability of the participant and then adjusting automatically the difficulty of the trials based on this 
ability level or individual threshold according to the condition. In the success condition, the 
difficulty level was set below the participant’s individual threshold, this manipulation tending to 
lead to a neutral mood state. In contrast, in the failure condition, the difficulty level was set 
above the participant individual threshold, inducing a negative mood state. Participants were not 
informed that levels of difficulty would be manipulated, or that a mood change was expected. 
Indeed, to make the procedure look more natural, each task was composed of four phases. After 
the four trials of the practice phase, the trials composing the next phases (titration, initial success, 
experimental phase) continued without any indication to the participant. The order of 
experiments and conditions was quasi-counterbalanced among the participants, according to the 
following factors: Experiment 1 or Experiment 2 first; success or failure condition first in each 
experiment; and version allocated for success or failure, in each experiment. More details about 
the procedure and the experiments can be found in Mograbi et al. (2012). 
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For this study, each task was followed by a 10-minute break intended to allow the participants to 
return to a neutral mood state and to carry-over effects. During this time, participants were 
allowed to rest while data were collected with the caregivers. 
 
2.2.1. Experiments 
2.2.1.1. Experiment 1 – Reaction time 
In version 1 a ‘car’ appeared on the left side of the screen moving to the right, with the 
participants having to ‘stop’ the car as soon as it appeared by pressing the spacebar of the 
keyboard. In version 2 objects (e.g. ball, egg or vase) appeared to fall from the ‘top’ of the screen 
and participants had to ‘catch’ the object by pressing the spacebar. In both versions participants 
received feedback after each trial. Difficulty was manipulated by varying the object’s speed. 
 
2.2.1.2. Experiment 2 – Memory  
The two versions of the experiment were based around memory span tasks. For version 1, a set 
of ten identical objects (e.g. teapot, bucket) were shown on a computer screen and these were 
highlighted individually in a random sequence using a red square surround. Immediately after, 
participants had to point to the same objects in sequence. For version 2, a sequence of digits 
ranging from 0 to 9 was presented both auditorily and visually to the participants, who 
immediately repeated it back sequentially to the experimenter. In both versions participants 
received feedback after each trial. Difficulty was manipulated by varying the length of the 
sequence from one to ten objects/digits. 
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2.3. Measures 
2.3.1. Background variables  
Global cognitive functioning was assessed with the Mini-mental State Examination (MMSE; 
Bertolucci et al., 1994; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). To screen for levels of depression, 
the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS-15; Almeida & Almeida, 1999; Yesavage et al., 1982) was 
used. The GDS-15 consists of 15 yes/no questions, with each item representing a common 
symptom of depression in older adults and being scored as absent or present. Total scale scores 
vary from 0 to 15, with higher scores indicating greater severity of depression. Apathy was 
measured using the Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES-S; Guimarães, Fialho, Carvalho, Santos, & 
Caramelli, 2009; Marin, Biedrzycki, & Firinciogullari, 1991). Items of the AES-S explore the 
participant’s interests and daily activities, being rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale with the 
following categories: Not at All True, Slightly True, Somewhat True, and Very True. The total 
scores range from 18 to 72 points, with a higher total score indicating greater severity of apathy. 
In the current study, the questions of the GDS-15 and AES-S were read to the participants, in 
order to ensure good comprehension.  
All the background variables were collected before the application of the experimental 
procedures (see table 1). 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
2.3.2. Self-reported emotion 
A self-report scale was used to assess the participants’ mood state before and after the mood 
induction.  Participants were asked to rate four paired emotions (frustrated and satisfied, 
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disappointed and pleased) with a 5-point Likert scale: Not at all (0), a little (1), moderate (2), 
quite a bit (3) and extremely (4). Before and after each task of the SFM participants were asked: 
‘I would like to know how you are feeling right now. How [emotion] are you at this moment, 
from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’?’ Further explanation was given if needed. The negative 
emotions in the two pairs were scored reversely and summed with the score of the positive 
emotions, creating a general score ranging from 0 to 16, with higher scores indicating more 
positive emotion. 
 
2.3.3. Anosognosia questionnaire 
In order to assess the level of anosognosia before and after the mood manipulation, the 
participants were asked to answer six questions selected from the Anosognosia Questionnaire-
Dementia (AQ-D; Almeida & Crocco, 2000; Migliorelli et al., 1995). The AQ-D was specifically 
designed to measure anosognosia in dementia, covering functional changes commonly found 
during the course of this illness. Three items were selected from the first section of the 
questionnaire, which assesses performance of basic and instrumental activities of daily living and 
the three other questions were selected from the second section, which examines changes in 
mood and behavior in relation to daily activities (see table 2). Scoring for each item ranges from 
0 (never experiences impairment in the activity) to 3 (always experience impairments). 
 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
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2.4. Ethical issues 
The main ethical issue of the study was related to the use of a mood induction procedure. 
However, mood induction procedures are widely used in experimental research, giving rise to 
moods which are mild and short lived (Frost & Green, 1982; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Martin, 
1990). 
All participants provided informed consent, with caregivers also giving their agreement for the 
patient to take part. At the end of the session participants were debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiments and told about the success/failure manipulation. 
The project was approved by the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)/ Institute of 
Psychiatry Ethics Committee (Research Ethics Committee number 536.634). 
 
2.5. Statistical analysis 
Differences in awareness of symptoms were explored with repeated-measures ANOVAs, with 
time (pre- / post-SFM) and condition (success / failure) as within-subject factors. For the analysis 
of the self-reported emotions, repeated-measures ANOVAs were also used, with time (pre- / 
post-SFM) and condition (success / failure) as within-subject factors. In both cases, planned 
pairwise comparisons followed the ANOVAs. When significant interactions for awareness of 
symptoms were found, Pearson's bivariate correlation were calculated between awareness change 
and actual performance. We performed the analyses separately for each experiment (reaction 
time and memory).  
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3. Results 
3.1. Experiment 1 – Reaction time 
3.1.1. Self-reported emotion 
Table 3 indicates that the emotional state of the participants was similar before performing the 
tasks, and that the failure condition specifically induced a negative mood state. Repeated-
measures ANOVA showed a significant interaction between time and condition (F (1, 21) = 
5.92, p = .024, ηp2 = .22). This indicates that there were significant changes in the participant’s 
self-report of mood depending on the type of condition. Pairwise comparisons showed that the 
participants rated their mood lower after the memory task in the failure condition (p = .008), but 
not in the success condition (p = .389). Additionally, after performing the task, the participants 
rated their mood as lower in the failure condition than in the success condition (p = .039), but not 
before the task (p = .367). There was no significant main effect of time (F (1, 21) = 1.42, p = 
.247, ηp2 = .06) or condition (F (1, 21) = .92, p = .348, ηp2 = .04). 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
3.1.2. Awareness of symptoms 
Figure 1 indicates that doing the tasks did not have an effect on the participants’ awareness of 
symptoms. Repeated-measures ANOVA showed no interaction between time and condition (F 
(1, 21) = 1.72, p = .204, ηp2 = .08) or significant main effect of time (F (1, 21) = .03, p = .862, ηp2 
= .001) or condition (F (1, 21) = 1.43, p = .246, ηp2 = .06).  
 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
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3.2. Experiment 2 – Memory 
3.2.1. Self-reported emotion 
Table 4 shows that the emotional state of the participants was similar before performing the tasks 
and that the failure condition specifically induced a negative mood state. There was a significant 
interaction effect between condition and time, F (1, 21) = 10.95, p = .003, ηp2 = .34. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the participants rated their mood lower after the memory task in the 
failure condition (p = .002), but not in the success condition (p = .389). The participants also 
rated their mood lower in the failure versus the success condition after performing the task (p = 
.005), but not before the task (p = .463). There was also a significant main effect of time (F (1, 
21) = 6.65, p = .018, ηp2 = .24), showing that mood is lower overall after performing the tasks, 
and a significant main effect of condition (F (1, 21) = 5.86, p = .025, ηp2 = .22), showing that it is 
lower overall in the failure condition. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
3.2.2. Awareness of symptoms 
Figure 2 shows that awareness changed according to the task condition. There was a significant 
interaction effect between condition and time (F (1, 21) = 10.24, p = .004, ηp2 = .33). Paired 
comparisons revealed increased awareness of deficit after performing the tasks in the failure 
condition (p = .001), but not in the success condition (p = .131). Further paired comparisons 
showed that the participants had a similar level of awareness before performing the task in both 
conditions (p = .771). There was also a significant main effect of the time on ratings of 
anosognosia (F (1, 21) = 5.65, p = .027, ηp2 = .21) and a significant main effect of the condition 
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on ratings of anosognosia (F (1, 21) = 10.06, p = .005, ηp2 = .32). A Pearson's bivariate 
correlation was also performed and showed a significant relationship between the change in the 
rating of anosognosia and the actual performance of the participants only in the failure condition 
(r = .66, p = .001). 
 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
4. Discussion 
The present study explored the effects of mood on the level of awareness regarding symptoms in 
AD patients. We experimentally induced neutral and negative mood states in patients with AD 
and measured the resulting changes in the level of awareness regarding cognitive and behavioral 
symptoms in two experiments, with reaction time and memory tasks. In both experiments, the 
results showed that after performing the task in the failure condition, people with AD reported a 
more negative mood than before performing the task. As expected, performing the tasks in the 
success condition led to a neutral mood state. These results confirmed the efficacy of the mood 
induction procedure. In addition, the AD patients showed an increase in their apparent awareness 
following the negative mood induction, endorsing more symptoms on the AQ-D. Nevertheless, 
this improvement occurred only in the memory experiment, with the level of awareness 
remaining unchanged in the reaction time task experiment. 
 These results are in line with previous findings indicating that people with AD who are 
more depressed show more apparent awareness (e.g., Clare et al., 2011; Harwood et al., 2000). 
To explain this relation, a theory suggests that depression causes only apparently more awareness 
because of a negative bias when reporting problems (Mograbi & Morris, 2014). However, this 
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theory does not seem to be able to fully explain the results of the present study. Indeed, patients 
with AD, despite reporting a negative mood following the mood induction procedure in both 
experiments, showed a greater awareness of the symptoms only when the task used in the SFM 
was memory-based. 
An explanation for these findings might be found in the Mood Congruent/Dependent 
Memory theories. According to the MCM theory, the negative mood state induced by the SFM in 
our experiments led the participants to recall more negatively toned memories when asked about 
their deficits, generating a greater awareness. Following a similar idea, MDM effect might also 
be able to account for the results of the present study. MDM is defined as the ability to increase 
the recall of learned material, when the subject’s emotional state is the same at the time of 
encoding and at the time of retrieval, regardless of the content of the material (Bower, 1981). As 
shown by Mograbi et al. (Mograbi et al., 2012), AD patients exhibit an implicit emotional 
reactivity to failure, despite a lack of explicit awareness. In other words, AD patients might be 
encoding events of failure when they are currently experiencing low mood. Based on the MDM 
theory, the AD patients who were experiencing a negative mood state during our experiment, 
would be expected to increase the recall of events encoded when they were already in a low 
mood, namely events of failure. Therefore, when asked about their deficits, participants 
presented a greater awareness about their own difficulties.  
However, the MCM and MDM phenomena do not account for the differences between 
the two experiments, namely that AD patients improve their awareness of deficits when the 
negative mood induction procedure uses a memory task, but not when a reaction time task is 
used? An additional explanation might emerge from the Context-Dependent Memory (CDM) 
effect. CDM is defined as an increased recall of material when the context at encoding and 
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retrieval is the same and the context is understood as external (e.g. spatial). In the case of the 
present study, the context can be seen as the type of task the participant is involved in. Indeed, 
AD patients are constantly confronted with memory failure situations, and during these 
situations, they might be encoding having difficulties. So, when exposed to a similar memory 
failure situation (in Experiment 2), they experience an increased recall of their own difficulties, 
leading to an improvement of their awareness.  
Our findings may have important clinical implications. Firstly, the study shows again 
how exposure to failure reduces mood state in AD (Mograbi, Brown, et al., 2012) and this has 
implications for how mood might be adversely affected in everyday life. Secondly, the greater 
apparent awareness of deficit following failure experience in the memory condition suggests that 
levels of recorded anosognosia might vary according to when in a clinical session a person has 
been exposed to failure, perhaps involving neuropsychological assessment. The study also 
underlines the importance of the context, showing that only memory-based tasks produce the 
specific effect and this might be consistent with everyday experience where memory difficulties 
produce some of the most disabling effects. Finally, studies show that lack of awareness 
regarding the deficits in AD seems to be protective from developing depression (Clare et al., 
2012; Harwood et al., 2000) and, consistent with this, it is possible that shaping the environment 
of a person to reduce exposure to failure might help to retain mood state, whilst making then less 
aware of their deficit. 
It is necessary to consider some limitations of the present study. Indeed, our small sample 
size may affect generalizability of the results and further studies are needed to confirm our 
findings. Another limitation of the study refers to the absence of a control group. Healthy 
controls were not used to explore the impact of mood on the level of anosognosia, because, by 
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definition, a healthy control group would not show the lack of awareness associated with 
dementia. The current study was also limited to a degree by the methodology used to assess the 
participants’ awareness. Indeed, the same questions were used to assess awareness before and 
after all the conditions. As pointed by Marcel et al. (2004), patients with plegia following stroke 
may learn how to respond to awareness measures when the questions are repeated. Nevertheless, 
the present study was conducted with people with dementia and the order of experiments and 
conditions was quasi-counterbalanced among the participants. In addition, changes in awareness 
were observed only after the failure memory task, suggesting that the results cannot be simply 
explained by practice effects.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study exploring in an experimental design 
the relation between mood state and awareness in patients with AD. As most of the studies 
highlighted, the existence of a relation between anosognosia and mood state is now well 
accepted. However, the direction of this relation is still debated in the literature. One theory is 
that the awareness of the deficits leads to a higher negative mood state, through a reactive 
depression phenomenon. Another theory suggests that depression leads to report more 
difficulties overall. The results of the present study support the notion that negative mood leads 
to a greater awareness of the deficits, and the best explanatory model is to be found in the Mood 
Congruent Memory and Mood/Context Dependent Memory phenomena. Further investigations 
of the relation between mood and awareness are needed with larger samples and the inclusion of 
other methodology, such as neuroimaging. 
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Table 1 – Sample characteristics 
Variable AD group (n=22) 
Mean (SD) 
Age 78.1 (5.6) 
Gender* 17 / 5 
Years of education 8.1 (4.2) 
MMSE 21.5 (3.1) 
AES 35.7 (6.1) 
GDS-15 2.5 (1.2) 
* # female/ male 
 
 
Table 2 – Anosognosia questionnaire  
 Never  Sometimes  Often Always  
1. Do you have problems remembering the date? 0 1 2 3 
2. Do you have problems remembering where you 
leave things in your home? 0 1 2 3 
3. Do you have problems remembering 
appointments? 0 1 2 3 
4. Are you more rigid in your decisions, with less 
capacity to adapt to new situations? 0 1 2 3 
5. Are you more irritated? Do you easily lose your 
temper? 0 1 2 3 
6. Do you feel more depressed? 0 1 2 3 
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Table 3 – Self-reported emotion before and after the SFM for the success and failure 
condition in Experiment 1 (reaction time) 
 
 Success task Mean 
(SD) 
Failure task 
Mean (SD) 
Pre-SFM 12.09 (1.69) 12.36 (1.56) 
Post-SFM 12.36 (1.89) 11.64 (1.87) 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Self-reported emotion before and after the SFM for the success and failure 
condition in Experiment 2 (memory) 
 
 Success task Mean 
(SD) 
Failure task 
Mean (SD) 
Pre-SFM 12.27 (1.52) 12.45 (1.71) 
Post-SFM 12.55 (1.74) 10.86 (2.57) 
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Figure 1 – Awareness of symptoms during experiment 1 
 
 
Figure 2 – Awareness of symptoms during experiment 2 
 
 
